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I Introduction
How cloes the prospect of future debt renegotiation affect the lender's security interests at thc contracting date? We study this question in a simple model of borrowing and lending with asymmetric information. A risk-neutral entrepreneur needs to raise capital for a risky investment project. The project outcome, however, cannot directly be observed by the creditors. The optimal loan arrangement is a debt contract with a bankruptcy clause that acts as a payment incentive for the entrepreneur. The institution of bankrupty allows the creditor to take possession oÍ some of the entrepreneur's assets in the event of dcfault. We show that the extent of the entrepreneur's liabilities in the optimal loan coutract depends upon the creditor's commitment to impose bankruptcy should default ever occur. If the creditor is precommited not to forgive any portion of the outstanding debt, a limited liability arrangement is optimaL This means that default should entitle the creditor to liquidateonly the assets remaining from the project that has been financed lry Lhe loau. In Lhe absence of precornmitrneuL, however, such limitation of liability may no lunger be optimal. Instead, the íssuance o( debt may eí}'iciently be secured in addition by thc cntrepreneur's pcrsoual wealth outsidc Lhe projecL.
Altlrough outside collateral increases the total amount of assets liquidated in the event of bankruptcy, it may lower the expected dead-weight loss associated with inef~icient asset liquiclation. We show that collateral requirements make it more likely that the initial dcbt contract is renegotiated and some part of the debt forgiven in case the entrepreneur dc~~lar~~s hiuisclf uuable to pay his dcbt in full. IIy (avoring dcbt rcncgotiatiou colla.tcua.l nu4y t.hus hclp avoiding an inc~fficicnt changc in project owncrship.
Ileuegotiation will occur when the borrower-lender relationship reaches a point wherc the initial contract stipulates an ex-post inefficient outcome. Usually the creditor is less~( li~i~~nt as rnanagcr of Lhc project's assa-ts Lhan is thc lrorrowcr so that bankruptcy insi,y prove ex-post inefficient. "I'he contracting parties~nay achieve a 1'areto-improvernent. by writ.inh a nc~w~untrac-t, undcr which t.hc~c~nl.n~~,rc~neur inainL.rinx prujc"c~t own~rship al, u rc"cluced debt IeveL The possibility of renegotiatiun i~uplies that default will uoL always be penalized by bankruptcy and both parties to the loan realize Lhis. Knowing that thcrc is a cliance of debt forgiveness, the borrower tnay falsely claim that tbe debt excceds Lhe investment's return and that he is forced to default. This motive for cheating is weakened whcn collateral has been posted. The higher the degree of collateralization, the more 2 inclin~d is the creditor to believe that the project return actually is low when he observes dcfaulL. Conscquently he finds the option of taking over the project less profitable in co,nparison to forgiving a portion of the debt. In this way, outside collateral may reduce tl,e~expected cost oC bankruptcy. Its benefit is positively related to the size of the deadwcit;ht loss resulting froin projc~ct liyuidation. Fspecially high-risk finns will find il. a~lv;,nl.at;,~nus Lu o(fc~r c~ollaLc~ral Lo Lhc~ir poL,~ntial c-rr,liturs.
A couviucing explanation of the existence of secured debt~uuat demoustrate LhaL its use may provide gains that exceed its costs.'~If collateral merely redistributed wealth between the borrower and lender in the event of default, other contractual devices that avoid costly liquidation of collateralized assets, would prove advantageous. To compensate the lender for the risk of default, firms would be better off by paying interest rates that reflect their risk category instead of selling secured debt. The recent literature on credit contracts with asymmetric information shows that this argument fails if the lender knows less than the borrower about the investment's riskiness. In credit markets with moral hazard or adverse selection outside collateral may serve as an incentive or screening device (see Besanko and Thakor (1987) , Bester (1985 Bester ( , 1987 , and Chan and Kanatas (1985) ). Outside collateral increases the punishment for default. Ií the borrower can choose among a variety of projects with different riskiness, collateral enforces the selection of less risky projects. Similarly, as a response to adverse selection lenders may offer a menu of contracts to sort loan applicants into risk categories. Entrepreneurs with low prol,ability of default then revcal Lhcrosclves by accepting collatcral reyuirerncnts which would be unaLLractive for high risks. In snnnnary, this literature predicts a negativer elation between default risk and the amount of collateral. This prediction is opposite to the conventional wisdom that high-risk firms have to issue security in order to attracL crcd i t.ors.2t 'I'o focus on the impact of renegotiation on the terms of the initial debt contract, we consider a model where all parties have ex-ante symmetric information. The investment's return distribution and the entrepreneur's ability to pay his debt are not affected bv the terms of the loan agreement. In contrast with the incentive or screening explanation, we find that collateral is more likely to be used for financing high-risk investments.
Indeed, we conclude that renegotiation may seriously undermine the role of collateral as a scrcrning device. Because also high-risk entrepreneurs find collateralization advanta-givnis, low-risk entrepreneurs may no longer be able to distinguish themselves by posting collxtcral.
Our basic model is inspired by Gale and Ilellwig (1985) and Diamond (1984) , who derive debt contracts as optimal arrangements under asymmetric information about project outcomes. Their analysis, however, presumes precommitment so that contracts may in~lude ex-post inefficiencies that are common knowledge. Huberman and Kahn (1988) study debt renegotiation in a model where borrower and lender have symmetric information but return realizations are not verifiable. In this context, there is no ex-post inefficient bankruptcy and the institution oí limited liability suf8ces to encourage the entrepreneur to pay his debt. Hart and Moore (1989) show that debt renegotiation may irivolve inefficient asset liquidation despite symmetric information. In their multi-period model this may happen because the entrepreneur cannot commit credibly to pay a certain amount of money in the future. Much of the literature on debt renegotiation deals with the case of sovereign debt (see, e.g., Bulow and Rogoff (1989) , Hellwig (1989), and hernandez and Rothenthal (1988) ). The basic assumption of this literature is that there is no third party enforcement of contracts. 'I'his restricts Lhe possibility of secured lending because in the event of default the creditor has at most limited access to the borrower's assets.
'1'he remainder of this paper consists of four Sections. Section II presents an extensive game of contract design and renegotiation. Section III studies the case of precommitment as a point of reference. Optimal contracts in the absence of precommitment are analyzed in Section IV. Section V concludes.
II The Basic Model
Consider a risk-neutral entrepreneur who is endowed with a project. The project requires some fixed initial investment 1 and yields the random return X. With probability 0 C p c 1 the project is successful and the return realization is X,; if the project fails, the rcturn is X~, with X, 1 X~~0.
The entrepreneur has no liquid funds to finance the investment. He raises the amount I by issuing debt. As in Diamond (1984) or in Gale and Hellwig (1985) , this form of finance results from the assumption that borrower and ]ender have asymmetric information. '[he entrepreneur observes the return realization at no cost. The creditor receives this information only after taking over the project. However, such a transfer of ownership is costly. The creditor's valuation of the project return X is~X, with 0 G a G I.
'I'he coat ( I-c:)X arises because the original entrepreneur has more ability to completc the project or because monitoring and liquidating the project is costly Cor the creditor.
Altio wc~will asaunre Lhat outsiders rernain uninfornu~d ahout Lhc project outcomc even wh~~n the c reditur brcoincs owner uf t.hc, prujc~rt. Lc,t n what follows, we will assume
As a result, making a loan exposes the creditor to the risk of default. Condition (2) implies that in case of project failure the creditor cannot recover the amount I even when he takes over all of the entrepreneur's assets. Therefore, the debt contract must j spe~ci(y a repayment ohligation R which the entrepreneur is able to mc~et only in the c'ase~of success. Indr~erd, the creditor's expected payoff would be negative as long as
As a further implication, the constraint C C W limits the use of collateral as a means to enforce repayment. Because R~W-~X~, the successful entrepreneur would rather pay X~and give up his wealth W than pay R. Some models of the credit market assume that the borrower repays his loan only if the value of the collateral exceeds his debt (see,, e.g., Barro (1976) and Benjamin (1978) ). Assumption (2) rules out this inotive for cotlateralization. In our model, the creditor's right to foreclose on the project is essential for giving the borrower an incentive to pay his debt.
In summary, the debt contract I' -(R, C) obliges the entrepreneur to pay the amount R; failure to fulfill this obligation entitles the creditor to take over the project and 
III Optïmal Contracts without Renegotiation
First, we want to take a look at the contracting problem in the absence of debt renegotiation. We thus study the subgame-períect equilibrium of the game described in the forgoing Section under the exogenous restriction b-I. This serves to illustrate the relation between renegotiation and collateralization. It should not suggest that the creditors would prefer to commit themselves not to renegotiate if they had the means for such a commitment. The question of whether ex ante commitment of this kind is actually desirable will be addressed in Section IV.
Note that our description of debt contracts precludes the use of random devices. The creditor's right in the event of default is deterministic; he cannot impose bankruptcy with some contractually specified probability. As noted by Townsend (1979) and Mookerjee and Png (1989), stochastic auditing may be pre[erable in situations with costly monitoring of income realizations so that the assumption of deterministic contracts may be restrictive. Loan contracts specifying a random allocation of ownership rights, however, are hardly observed in reality. As a theoretical justification we assume that random devices are not verifiable so that stochastic outcomes are not contractible. It is important to bear in mind that as a result of this assumption the initial contract is incomplete.
W hen the creditor always uses his right Lo foreclose on the debtor's assets in the event of default, the successful entrepreneur is better off by paying his debt as long as R G X,.
Commitment not to forgive any part of the debt constitutes a strong enforcement mechanism which induces the entrepreneur to reveal his type truthfully. As in Ga1e and Hellwig (1985) , the threat of bankruptcy serves to satisfy incentive-compatibility conditions which make sure that the entrepreneur tells the truth for each return realization.
Isuforcing truth-Lelling behavior, however, has its cost. With probal~ility 1-p projecl.
uwn~~rtihip docs uot rest with tbc ent.repr~,nrur. "}'hi~following msult dcals wif.h thiõ pti~nality of collateralization in this situation.
Proposition 1: Assume that creditors are commited not to forgive any debl so thal b-I. Then in equálibrium a loan contracl I" is signed which salisfies C" -0.
Proof: As a result of competition ín stage 1, I" maximizes the entrepreneur's expected payoff subject to the lenders' break-even constraint. Define R' by 
Now consider any other contract Iwhich gives positive expected payoffs to the firm.
Then R G X, again implies d-0 so that the lender breaks even if
Given (5), the entrepreneur's profit írom I' equals
(6) P(X. -R) -(1 -P)CpX, f(1 -P)(aX~-(1 -Q)C) -1 G p(X, -R').
This proves that any contract I with C~0 is suboptimal and that in equilibrium the project is financed by I". Q.E.D.
Collateral cannot improve efficiency if bankruptcy occurs solely as a result of project failure. In Lhis case it only increases the dead-weight cost of the change in firm owner-
ship. For collateral to become efíective, it must have an impact upon the equilibrium probability of bankruptcy. As we shall see, this may happen when debt renegotiation is possible.
IV Renegotiation and the Optimality of Collateral
In the absence of precommitment the appropriate solution concept for the contracting game is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This basically extends the subgame perfect equilibrium by requiring that in the final game stage the creditor's decision has to be optimal given his information, where posterior probabilities are obtained by updating priors according to Bayes' rule. When default occu;s, the creditor remains uninformed about the project outcome. From Bayes' rule the posterior probability that X, has been realized is pd ( 
Given the lender's behavior, the successful entrepreneur's expected payoff from defaulting is (1-6)(X, -X~)-C. He loses the collateral C but with probability (1-6) he maintains ownership of the firm by paying the reduced debt X~. It follows from (8) that 0 G d C 1 and so also the borrower randomizes after observing X-X,. For him to be indifferent bet.wcwn default and repayment, it must be the case that
X,-R-(1-b)(X,-X~)-C.
Solving ec{uations (8) and (9) coutract 1' with It~X~-~W is sigued, Nropoaition 'L applies aud so the creditor receives the payment R with probability p (1 -d') . When default occurs he is indifferent between bankruptcy and renegotiation. Therefore, with probability pd' f 1-p the creditor receives the payoff Xt~-~3C -I. Accordingly, for I' to be individually rational for the creditor, it has to be the case that
The entrepreneur's payoff is -C when the project fails; otherwise he is indifferent between defaulting and paying R. Therefore, his expected payoff from signing I' is given as p(X, -
As a result of creditor competition, the constraint (11) must be Fiineiing in ec{uilibrium so that substituting R from ( I 1) yields
Thus maximizing the entrepreneur's payoff with respect to C subject ot 0 G C G W
l, this coudition is easily seen to be equivalent to f3~Q. Of course, C' -0 solves Lhe
Whether posting collateral is optimal depends upon the size of the entrepreneur's comparative advantage to own and manage thc firm. For a given value of the parameter j3, the gains from collateralization are the higher the lower the value of a. This is means collateral becomes useful when the costs of ]iquidating the firm are sufficiently high.
When project ownership is irreleva,nt as a gces to one, collateral requirements turn out to be suboptimal.
The relation between project risk and the equilibrium contract ptovides another interesting insight. To investigate this relationship, we define the parameter '1'hc resulL has thc following intuition. "1'hc prospect of dcLt rcucgotiation uo longcr induces truthtelling behavior on the part of the entrepreneur. In this situation the intention of collateral agreements is not to punish for project failure but to make default.
less attractive in the event of success. As Proposition`l shows, the equilibrium likelihood of dishonesty d' is inversely related to the project's success probability p. Therefore a higher success rate makes it more likely that the entrepreneur will lose his outside assets because o( project failure rather than because of the attempt to cheat. As a consequence, collateral is more effective with a high risk of project failure. '1'his effect is especially harmful because in some cases the successful project is liquidated. Note that competition reduces the creditor's expected profits to zero in any equilibrium. There[ore, the entrepreneur's expected payoff is critical for evaluating the welfare implications of precommitment.
Proposition 5: The entrepreneur's ezpected payo,(j is higher in the equilibrium wheT~e renegotiutioa is possible than in the equilibriurn with precommitrraent nol to renegotiate.
Proof: The entrepreneur's equilibrium payoff in the two categories of e.quilibrium is given by (9) and (12), respectively. Suppose, contrary to the Proposition, that the expression in (12) does not exceed the expression in (4). Because C is chosen to maximize (12), this implies
Using (7) and ( 8), it fol}ows that ( 14) is equivalent to
BuL (15) It is important for this result that Che initial contract ia iu~o.nplcie ;n i,rat it.
does not allow for randomization. If stochastic debt forgiveness were contractible, the 'renegotiation-proofness' principle would apply which implies that the absence of commitmcnL lowcrs welfare. Proposition 5 is an example demonstrating that this principle may fail to hold when contracts are incomplete. As a result, we may expect to ob- Our discussion of the conflict between Proposition 4 and the signaling motive for collateral indicates another reason why renegotiation may lead to adverse selection. In the absence of renegotiation entrepreneurs with good projects can distinguish themselves from those with bad projects by posting more collateral. But, Proposition 4 shows that also the high-risk entrepreneurs will find it advantageous to offer collateral when there is a chance of renegotiation. This means that renegotiation may preclude a separating equilibrium where collateral serves as a screening device. Good and bad projects will then be pooled and, as showrr by De Meza and Webb (1987) , the equilibrium will have a tendency towards a higher level of aggregate investment than is socially optimal.
V Conclusion "Chis paper investigates how the prospect of future debt renegotiation affects the lender's security interests at the contracting date. The terms of the initial debt contract play a strategic role in the development of the borrower-lender relationship; indirectly they determine the likelihood of renegotiation and the terms of the renegotiated contract. Renegotiation occurs because the absence oí precommitment precludes incredible bankruptcy threats. As a result, there is a chance that the creditor responds to default by forgiving some part of the debt rather than by imposing bankruptcy. This in turn influences the borrower's default decision. In our model the creditor cannot distinguish whether the borrower defaults voluntarily or whether he is actually unable to meet his payment obligations. The chance of debt forgiveness may induce the borrower to falsely report that the investment's return ís to low to pay the full amount of debt.
We show that these circumstances favor the issuance of debt which is secured by outside assets. The event of default entitles the creditor to liquidate the borrower's collateralized wealth in addition to the assets remaining from the investment project.
Although outsidF collatc~ral incrc~ases the tot.al amount of asscts liquidatcd in the casfũ f hankrul~t~,y, pc~rhaps surl,riaingly il. inay x~t.iuilly luwi.r IJu~~~xl,i~c tc~l~li~a~l wi~it;lit lu,ti a,,~~riat~~~l wit.h axn~~l. li~tni~l:~l.iun. 'I'h~~m:c~~ni iv LhaL cull:Lt~~raliral.iun n.~luc rv t.hi~~I~~btui'v mot.ives for voluntary dcfaulL ao that baukruptcy is likely to occur. Wc show Lhat this effect is especially relevant ïor high-risk investment projects. '1'herefore, such firms arc more likely to be financed through loans that include collateral requirements than lowrisk firms.
While debt renegotiation may simply be interpreted as resulting from the creditor's inability to precommit himself, we find that renegotiation may in fact increase welfare.
This provides an efficiency explanation of why debt renegotiation is frequently observed i :, in practict~. We are careful, however, to point out that our assumption of ex-ante syrnmetric information is essential for this result.
is Footnotes 1. Schwartz (1981) gives a critical review of explanations of the existence of secured debt.
'l. "I'his view is empirically supported by Leeth and Scott's (1989) analysis of small business loans.
a. In prinr.iplc, a cunl.ract cocild t.rausfe~r som~of the cutrepreneur's illiquid asscl.s iudependently of whether 6c fulfills his repaymcut obligatiou or not. lt is casy to see, however, that such an arrangement would be suboptimal if (i G 1.
4. Note that p G p is consistent with assumption ( 1) unless (1 -~3)I~(1 -Qa)X~.
If p 1 1, Proposition 4 simply says that setting C' -W is always optimal.
